Depersonalization „disorder“ from a constructivist viewpoint: construing
feelings of irreal-ity
Ursula E. Oberst, Sandra Ferragut
Facultat de Psicologia i Ciències de l’Educació, c/Cister,
24, 08022 Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
The symptom of depersonalization (DP) is described in the DSM-IV as
a psychological phenome-non that involves alterations in the experience
of the self in which the usual sense of one’s own reality is lost or changed,
generally sensed as feeling detached from one’s own mental processes or
body, as being in dream or an outside observer of oneself. While occasional
feelings of DP are very common (up to 80 % in sample populations) and can
occur spontaneously or under certain circumstances, a depersonalization
„disorder“ that causes considerable distress and is disabling seems to
be infrequent. Recently, a virtual self-help group of people affected by
severe DP was established on the internet. Different models for explaining
DP have been put forward: as a de-fense mechanism of the self (psychological
and psychoanalytical model) and as an organic dys-function or disorder
of the serotonin mechanism of the brain (medical model).
In this paper, the authors will give a critical review of these models
(„objectivist theories“) and then make an attempt to facilitate a constructivist
understanding for DP.
Basically, our model holds that what is considered a DP „disorder“ is
a form of construing an un-specific psycho-physiological sensation in a
socially unusual way, i.e. in the absence of validation given by other
people („fellow-sufferers“). Using the discourse of DP-affected people
as exam-ples, it is shown how the co-construction of this strange experience,
when shared with others, can change the personal meaning of, and suffering
from, depersonalization.
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